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Abstract
This paper studies relational contracts with partially persistent states, where the
distribution of the state depends on the previous state. When the states are observable,
with both exogenous and endogenous states, the optimal contract can be stationary,
and an effort schedule can be implemented with a stationary contract if and only if it
satisfies the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement constraint. The paper shows
how the joint surplus in the second best varies with the state. The paper then applies
the results to study implications for markets where the principal and the agent can be
matched with new partners. (JEL C73, D86, L14)
1 Introduction
Most literature assumes that in a repeated interaction, the states are independent and iden-
tically distributed over time. But the real-world interactions don’t always take place in an
i.i.d. environment. A shock to the cost of raw material is likely to persist for some time,
and if it becomes costly to perform a task this year, a firm may not expect the cost of
performing the task next year to be distributed in the same way as it would after a good
year. The production technology this period can also depend on the past realization of the
productivity. Anticipating the persistence of the states, the employers may not expect the
same effectiveness of the compensation scheme every period, and the optimal compensation
scheme may in fact depend on the state.
I study a relational contract model similar to that of Levin (2003) when the states are
partially persistent and there is moral hazard. The principal and the agent trade every
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period over an infinite horizon, and both parties are risk-neutral with a common discount
factor. At the beginning of each period, the payoff-relevant state is realized and becomes
observable to both the principal and the agent. Under a relational contract, the principal
offers a compensation scheme each period, and the agent decides whether or not to accept
it and how much effort to exert if he accepts the offer. The principal doesn’t observe the
agent’s effort, which leads to moral hazard, but he observes the outcome, which is a noisy
signal of the agent’s effort, and therefore can promise contingent payments on outcome.
The main results of the paper are in two parts. I characterize the optimal relational
contracts, both for exogenous states and endogenous states, and show that the optimal
contracts can be stationary. The second part applies the results to study the markets for
random matching.
There is a large literature on relational contracts, including Levin (2003) and Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy (2002).1 More recent papers consider environments with asymmetric
information, and most of the literature assumes that the environment is either stationary or
i.i.d. over time. My paper is most closely related to Levin (2003), where he shows that for
i.i.d. states, the principal can focus on maximizing the joint surplus and the optimal contracts
can be stationary. The necessary and sufficient condition to implement an effort schedule
with stationary contracts is that it satisfies the IC constraint and one other constraint.
The optimal contract either implements the first best or is a step function. Other related
literature is discussed at the end of this section.
Section 3 considers the results that hold for any type of persistence where the states
evolve exogenously and are observable before the agent exerts effort. As was the case with
i.i.d. states, the distribution of the joint surplus between the principal and the agent can
be separated from the problem of efficient-contracting, and in characterizing the Pareto-
optimal contracts, it is sufficient to focus on the joint surplus from the relationship. The
principal can always redistribute the surplus through the fixed wage in the initial period.
When the states follow a first-order Markov chain, the realization of the state this period
is a sufficient static for the distribution of the future states, and the principal can provide
all incentives by the bonus payments at the end of this period. It is optimal to provide the
same expected per period payoff to the agent in every state, and for each state, the principal
can offer a contract that maximizes the joint surplus. In particular, the principal can offer a
stationary contract every period. I define stationary contracts as contracts under which the
compensation scheme is identical in all periods; the wage and bonus payments are allowed to
depend on the realization of the state and the outcome in the given period, but they don’t
1Earlier literature on relational contracts focused on symmetric information case. See for example, Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Kreps (1990).
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depend on the history. Under a relational contract, there is a temptation to renege, and
the self-enforcement leads to the dynamic enforcement constraint as in the i.i.d. case. The
necessary and sufficient condition for an effort schedule to be implementable by a stationary
contract is that it satisfies the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement constraint. I also
show that the optimal contract either implements the first best level of effort, or it takes the
form of a step function.
In Section 4, I consider an alternative model in which the state is endogenous. From
an applied perspective, there are often environments where the agent’s effort affects the
distribution of the state. Specifically, I consider the environment in which the productivity
is the state variable. The distribution of productivity for the next period depends on the
current productivity and the agent’s effort, which implies that the agent’s effort affects
the distribution of states in all future periods. When the productivity is observable and the
persistence is of first-order, however, most results in Section 3 generalize to this environment.
The distribution of the joint surplus between the principal and the agent can be separated
from the problem of efficient contracting, and the optimal contract can still be stationary.
The productivity is a sufficient static for the distribution of future states, and the principal
can still provide all incentives by the compensation scheme at the end of the period. The
principal can offer a stationary contract that leaves the agent indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the offer. I also show a version of dynamic enforcement constraint which is,
together with the IC constraint, the necessary and sufficient condition to implement an effort
schedule with such stationary contracts.
I also consider two mechanisms through which the persistence of the states affect rela-
tional contracts. When the states are persistent, the joint surplus in the first best can vary
with the state, and incentive provision for given bonus cap can also vary with the state. I
consider two mechanisms separately, holding the other constant. I find that in both cases,
if the joint surplus in the first best increases with the state, or if the implementable level of
effort for given bonus cap increases with the state, the difference in the joint surplus between
the first best and the second best decreases with the state. The principal prefers relational
contracts to full-commitment contracts if and only if the initial state is sufficiently high.
The next section discusses the implications for the markets for random matching where
the principal and the agent can be randomly, anonymously, and costlessly matched with new
partners. The nature of the state leads to starkly different implications for the market. The
degree of cooperation varies with the nature of the state, and it also highlights the difference
between the i.i.d. states and the persistent states. The key step is to consider the bonus
cap from the dynamic enforcement constraint. When the states are i.i.d., or if the states
are persistent but common to all principal-agent pairs, cooperation is impossible; the parties
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cannot credibly promise any bonus payment, and the principal cannot induce any level of
effort from the agent. On the other hand, if the state is persistent and agent-specific, the
market turns into the market for lemons, and there is no market. The principal and the agent
stay in the same relationship forever. If the state is persistent and relationship-specific, there
will be a market, and the principal and the agent leave the current relationship if and only
if the expected joint surplus falls below some threshold.
There are some papers on relational contracts with persistent states. Thomas and Worrall
(2010) consider a two-sided incentive problem where the states and the efforts are observable
and the players have limited liability. McAdams (2011) considers joint-partnership games in
which the states are persistent and both the states and efforts are observable. The players
decide whether to stay in the relationship and how much effort to exert. The main difference
from my model is that there is no asymmetric information in their models, and there is
limited liability in Thomas and Worrall.
In Kwon (2012), I consider moral hazard with persistent states and full-commitment.
States are unobservable in Kwon (2012). Garrett and Pavan (2011, 2012) have moral hazard
and persistent private information. There are also papers on dynamic adverse selection
with persistent private information. Athey and Bagwell (2008) study collusion with private
cost shocks, and Battaglini (2005) considers consumers with Markovian types. Escobar and
Toikka (2012) show folk theorem results for Markovian types and communication.
The market setting in my paper is related to literature on repeated games with rematch-
ing. Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996) and Watson (1999) among others consider
repeated interactions when the players can exit the relationship in any period. The stage
game in these papers are similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, and most of them don’t have
monetary transfers. The equilibrium strategy is often to start small, which contrasts with
the stationary behavior in my model.
Lastly, this paper is also related to literature on partnership games with persistent states.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1996) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) study collusion in
nonstationary markets. In Rotemberg and Saloner, the potential gain from deviating is
higher in a higher state, and the future surplus is not affected by the state. In my first
model of Section 5, the gain from deviating is constant across the states, and it is the future
surplus that varies with the state; my model is closer to Haltiwanger and Harrington.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 describes the model, and
the general results are presented in Section 3. I consider an alternative model in Section 4
in which the state variable is endogenous. Section 5 discusses the types of persistent states
and their implications on the joint surplus in the second best. Section 6 applies the results
for the markets for random matching. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Model
The principal and the agent have the opportunity to trade over an infinite horizon, t =
0, 1, 2, · · · . Both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral, and the common discount
factor is δ < 1.
The principal has limited commitment power and can only employ relational contracts.
At the beginning of period t, the principal offers a compensation scheme to the agent, which
consists of a fixed salary wt and a contingent payment bt. Both the fixed salary and the
contingent payment can be functions of the history, which I will define momentarily. The
agent decides whether to accept the offer, and a payoff-relevant parameter θt is realized. Both
the principal and the agent observe the state. Note that the principal offers the compensation
scheme before the realization of the state; he offers a function of the state as fixed salary,
and the bonus payment is a function of the performance outcome.
Principal
makes
an offer.
Agent
accepts
/rejects.
θt becomes
observable.
Agent
chooses et.
Outcome yt
is realized.
Bonus
payment
is made.
Timing in Each Period
The state θt is drawn from the support Θ = [θ, θ¯]. The distribution of the state θt
depends only on the previous state θt−1. Denote the distribution of θt by P (θt|θt−1). The
distribution of the state doesn’t depend on the time index, and we have P (θt|θt−1) = P (θ1|θ0)
for all t ≥ 1. In the initial period, the state θ0 is distributed by P0(θ0). The distributions
P (θt|θt−1) and P0(θ0) are known to both the principal and the agent.
Assumption 1. The distribution of state θt+1 when the previous state was θt is given by
P (θt+1|θt) and is identical for all t ≥ 0.
After the principal offers a compensation scheme, the agent decides whether or not to
accept, dt ∈ {0, 1}. If the agent accepts the compensation scheme, the agent chooses how
much effort to exert, et ∈ E = [0, e¯]. The cost of effort, c(et, θt), increases with e with
c(e = 0, θ) = 0 for all θ and cee > 0. The agent’s effort generates outcome yt with the
distribution F (y|e, θ) and the support Y = [y, y¯].2 The expected per period joint surplus can
be written as a function of θ and e, S(e, θ) = E[y|e, θ]− c(e, θ). Throughout the paper, when
capitalized, S(e, θ) denotes per-period joint surplus in state θ if the agent chooses effort e.
2Most results of the paper hold for any distribution of the outcome.
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I allow the distribution of the outcome and the cost function to be dependent on the
state. If neither of them depends on the state, we are back to i.i.d. environment, and in
general, we can have one or the other to be state-dependent.
Each period, there are three pieces of payoff-relevant information: the cost-relevant pa-
rameter θt, the agent’s effort et, and the outcome yt. The agent observes all three parameters,
but the principal observes only θt and yt. The performance outcome is φt = {θt, yt}, and the
set of all performance outcome is denoted by Φ.
At the end of each period, the principal is obliged to pay the fixed salary wt, but the
contingent payment is only promised. Denote the total payment to the agent by Wt, and
Wt = wt + bt if the contingent payment is made, and it is Wt = wt if not.
If the agent rejects the principal’s offer, the parties receive their outside option for the
period. The agent’s outside option is u¯, and the principal’s outside option is p¯i. The joint
surplus from the outside option is denoted by s¯ = u¯+ p¯i.
Assumption 2 (Efficiency). The maximum joint surplus is strictly bigger than the outside
option for any state, but the outside option is weakly better than no effort. For all θ ∈ Θ,
maxe S(e, θ) > s¯ ≥ S(0, θ).
I assume that for any state θ, the maximum joint surplus is strictly bigger than the
outside option, but the outside option is weakly better than no effort. I also assume that
the outside options u¯, p¯i are independent of the state and constant over time. In Section 6,
I consider markets for random matching, and there will be endogenous outside options.
Given the distribution of the states, P (θt+1|θt), we can define the distribution of θt+τ
given θt, P (θt+τ |θt). Let p(θt+1|θt) be the pdf of θt+1, then we have
p(θt+τ |θt) =
∫
· · ·
∫
p(θt+τ |θt+τ−1) · · · p(θt+1|θt)dθt+τ−1dθt+1,
and P (θt+τ |θt) can be constructed from p(θt+τ |θt). The discounted payoffs to the parties
from date t given θt−1 are
ut(θt−1) = (1− δ)E[
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t{dτ (Wτ − c(eτ , θτ )) + (1− dτ )u¯}|θt−1],
pit(θt−1) = (1− δ)E[
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t{dτ (yτ −Wτ ) + (1− dτ )p¯i}|θt−1],
where the expectations are taken over P (θτ |θt−1), τ ≥ t, and F (·|e, θ). In period 0, the
expectation is also taken over P0(θ0). At each period, the parties maximize their expected
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payoffs. I define the expected joint surplus from period t as
st(θt−1) = ut(θt−1) + pit(θt−1).
Note that st(θt−1) is the per period average expected joint surplus, as it is discounted by
1− δ. When capitalized, S(e, θ) is the expected joint surplus from the given period for e, θ.
Let ht = (w0, d0, φ0,W0, · · · , wt−1, dt−1, φt−1,Wt−1) be the history up to period t and Ht
be the set of possible period t histories. Given any period t and history ht, a relational
contract specifies the compensation the principal offers, whether or not the agent accepts it,
and if the agent accepts the offer, the effort level. The compensation wt, bt are allowed to be
functions of the history, and they are functions of the following form:
wt : Ht ×Θ→ R,
bt : Ht × Φ→ R.
A relational contract is self-enforcing if it forms a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated
game.
3 Observable and Exogenous States
This section discusses the results that hold for any type of persistent states. The main results
of this section generalize the characterization in Levin (2003) to persistent states. When the
states are observable and exogenously given, the optimal contract can be stationary, and it is
optimal to provide the same expected per period payoff in every state. The self-enforcement
leads to the dynamic enforcement constraint as with i.i.d. states. An optimal contract either
implements the first best level of effort or takes the form of a step function.
A relational contract forms a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game, and there is
multiplicity of equilibria. Instead of characterizing all relational contracts, I focus on efficient
contracting and focus on the Pareto Frontier of the payoffs. The first result is to note that
the problem of efficient contracting can be separated from the problem of distribution even if
the states are persistent. The intuition is same as in Levin (2003). The principal can always
adjust the fixed salary to redistribute the surplus.
Proposition 1. Suppose there exists a relational contract with expected joint surplus s > s¯.
Any expected payoff pair (u, pi) with u ≥ u¯, pi ≥ p¯i, u + pi = s can be implemented with a
relational contract.
Proof. Consider the relational contract that provides s. The principal offers in the initial
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period w(θ0), b(φ0), and if the agent accepts, he exerts effort e(θ0). The continuation payoffs
under the contract are denoted by u(φ0) and pi(φ0), and the expected payoffs from the
contract are u0 and pi0. Without loss of generality, we can assume that off the equilibrium
path, the parties revert to the static equilibrium of (u¯, p¯i). The first period payment W is a
function of φ0.
The contract is self-enforcing if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) u0 ≥ u¯, pi0 ≥ p¯i,
(ii) e(θ0) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[(1− δ)W (φ0) + δu(φ0)|e, θ0]− c(e, θ0),
(iii) b(φ0) +
δ
1− δu(φ0) ≥
δ
1− δ u¯,
− b(φ0) + δ
1− δpi(φ0) ≥
δ
1− δ p¯i,
and (iv) each continuation contract is self-enforcing.
Given any (u, pi) such that u ≥ u¯, pi ≥ p¯i, u + pi = s, the principal can offer the same
b(φ0) and continuation contracts and adjust w(θ0) to
wˆ(θ0) ≡ w(θ0) + pi − pi0
1− δ .
The conditions are satisfied with the new contract, and it provides (u, pi) as the expected
payoffs.
As long as the expected payoff is greater than the outside option, the parties are willing
to initiate the contract. The principal can adjust the distribution of the joint surplus by
the fixed salary of the initial period, and the resulting contract is still self-enforcing because
the incentives are not affected. Given Proposition 1, we can restrict attention to optimal
relational contracts that maximize the joint surplus from the contract.
The next result is that despite the persistence of the states, the maximum joint surplus
can be acheived with stationary contracts. I define the stationarity of a contract as the
following:
Definition 1. A contract is stationary if Wt = w(θt) + b(φt), et = e(θt) at every t on the
equilibrium path for some w : Θ→ R, b : Φ→ R and e : Θ→ E.
Note that the contract is stationary on the equilibrium path. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that off the equilibrium path, the parties revert to the static equilibrium of
taking the outside option every period, (u¯, p¯i). With a stationary contract, the principal offers
the identical compensation scheme every period. The compensation scheme is independent
8
of the history, and it only depends on the performance outcome of the given period. The
fixed salary may depend on the state, but given the same state, the fixed salary is constant
across the time.
Proposition 2. The maximum joint surplus can be attained with a stationary contract.
Furthermore, it can be achieved with a contract that provides the same expected payoff to the
agent in every state.
Proof. Suppose a contract that maximizes the joint surplus provides wt, bt and the agent
chooses et. The first step is to construct an alternative contract wˆt, bˆt under which the agent
chooses the same level of effort et and his expected payoff is constant in every state.
When the states are observable and exogenously given, the distribution of the states from
period t + 1 only depends on θt, and the outcome yt doesn’t carry any information about
the future states. The principal can adjust the contingent payment bt and keep the expected
payoff in each state constant. Specifically, consider the following contract. Let ut(h
t, φt)
be the continuation value of the agent under the given contract, and define wˆt, bˆt as the
following:
bˆt(h
t, φt) ≡ bt(ht, φt) + δ
1− δ (ut(h
t, φt)− u¯),
wˆt(h
t, θt) ≡ u¯− Eyt [bˆt(ht, φt)|et(ht, θt)].
From
bˆt(h
t, φt) +
δ
1− δ u¯ = bt(h
t, φt) +
δ
1− δut(h
t, φt),
the agent chooses the same level of effort et under the new contract. The agent’s expected
payoff is u¯ for all t, ht, θt.
The next step is to show that we can choose w˜ : Θ → R, b˜ : Φ → R such that the
principal offers w˜, b˜ in every period. Consider wˆt and bˆt. The agent’s expected payoff is
constant over all t, ht, and θt, which implies that the agent’s IC constraint is determined by
the within period compensation scheme. Specifically, the agent chooses e such that
et(h
t, θt) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[bˆt(ht, φt)|e, θt]− c(e, θt).
When the agent’s IC constraints are myopic, the principal can replace a compensation
scheme for any given period with another compensation scheme without affecting the incen-
tives. The principal can also treat each θt separately, because the state is observable before
the agent chooses the effort. Specifically, let b˜ be the compensation scheme that maximizes
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the expected per period joint surplus for state θt:
b˜(θt, ·) ≡ arg max
bˆt(ht,{θt,·})
Ey[y|et(ht, θt), θt]− c(et(ht, θt), θt).
If there’s multiplicity of the compensation schemes, we can pick one without loss of generality.
Given b˜ : Φ→ R, the agent chooses e : Θ→ E such that
e(θt) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[b˜(φ)|e, θt]− c(e, θt).
Define w˜ as
w˜(θt) ≡ u¯− Ey[b˜(φ)|e(θt), θt],
and we have a stationary contract that maximizes the expected joint surplus. By construc-
tion, it is self-enforcing, and it provides the same expected payoff to the agent in all t, ht, θt.
Let s∗ be the minimum expected per period joint surplus over the states under b˜, w˜:
s∗ ≡ min
θ
{Ey[y|e(θ), θ]− c(e(θ), θ)}.
The principal can adjust the fixed salary and can provide any u such that u¯ ≤ u ≤ s∗ − p¯i
to the agent as the constant expected payoff.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can focus on stationary contracts that maximize the joint
surplus. I will next provide the necessary and sufficient condition for an effort schedule to
be implementable by a stationary contract. When the states are observable and exogenously
given, there is no information asymmetry about the distribution of future states. For the
agent’s IC constraints, only the sum of the present compensation and the continuation value
matters, and in particular, the principal and the agent use the same probability distribution
to evaluate the continuation values. Therefore, the principal can provide the incentives by
the present compensation and provide the same expected payoff in all periods and all states.
By doing so, the principal isolates the incentive provision to each period and the given state,
and the principal can offer an identical compensation scheme in all periods for the given
state. The maximum joint surplus can be attained with a stationary contract, and we can
restrict attention to stationary contracts that maximize the joint surplus.
With relational contracts, neither the principal or the agent commits to the contingent
payment, and there exists a temptation to renege on the promised payment. The contract
is self-enforcing if the principal and the agent have no incentives to renege. Since we are
interested in the maximum joint surplus, there is no loss of generality in assuming that a
deviation leads to the static equilibrium behavior. If the principal offers an unexpected com-
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pensation scheme, the agent accepts the offer but exerts zero effort. Following a deviation,
the parties receive their outside options p¯i and u¯.
Recall that when the states are persistent, the discounted payoffs at period t should be
conditional on state θt−1:
ut(θt−1) = (1− δ)E[
∑
τ=t
δτ−t{dτ (Wτ − c(eτ , θτ )) + (1− dτ )u¯}|θt−1],
pit(θt−1) = (1− δ)E[
∑
τ=t
δτ−t{dτ (yτ −Wτ ) + (1− dτ )p¯i}|θt−1],
and the expected joint surplus from t+ 1 is st+1(θt) = ut+1(θt) + pit+1(θt).
The principal makes the promised payment if and only if
δ
1− δ (pit+1(θt)− p¯i) ≥ supy b(θt, y),∀θt,
and for the agent to make the promised payment, we need
δ
1− δ (ut+1(θt)− u¯) ≥ − infy b(θt, y),∀θt.
From Proposition 1, the principal can redistribute the surplus by adjusting the fixed
wage, and the above inequalities can be combined in the dynamic enforcement constraint:
(DE)
δ
1− δ (st+1(θt)− s¯) ≥ supy W (θt, y)− infy W (θt, y).
The enforceable effort schedules are characterized by the agent’s IC constraint and the dy-
namic enforcement constraint.
Proposition 3. An effort schedule e(θ) with expected joint surplus s(θ) can be implemented
with a stationary contract if and only if there exists a payment schedule W : Φ → R such
that for all θ ∈ Θ,
(IC) e(θ) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[W (φ)|e, θ]− c(e, θ),
(DE)
δ
1− δ (s(θ)− s¯) ≥ supy W (θ, y)− infy W (θ, y).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose e(θ) is implementable. Let u(θ) and pi(θ) be the continuation value for
the agent and the principal when the previous state was θ. The IC constraint has to be
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satisfied, and we also know that
δ
1− δ (pi(θ)− p¯i) ≥ supy b(θ, y),∀θ, (1)
δ
1− δ (u(θ)− u¯) ≥ − infy b(θ, y),∀θ (2)
have to hold. Adding the two inequalities, we have the dynamic enforcement constraint.
(⇐) Suppose W (φ) and e(θ) satisfy the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement
constraint. Define
b(φ) = W (φ)− inf
φ
W (φ),
w(θ) = u¯− Ey[W (φ)|e(θ), θ],
and consider the stationary contract with w(θ), b(φ) and e(θ). The parties revert to the
static equilibrium if a deviation occurs. The agent receives u¯ as expected payoff in each
state, and the principal receives pi(θ) = s(θ)− u¯ if the previous state was θ. By the dynamic
enforcement constraint, s(θ) ≥ s¯ and pi(θ) ≥ p¯i for all θ. From the IC constraint, the agent
chooses e(θ) in each state θ, and it can be verified that Inequality (1) and (2) are satisfied.
Note that the continuation payoffs from period t+ 1 matter in the dynamic enforcement
constraint, but they don’t enter the agent’s IC constraint. Since the states are persistent,
the continuation payoffs ut+1(θt) and pit+1(θt) depend on the state θt. But the principal also
observes θt, and by Proposition 2, the principal can offer a stationary continuation contract
and the constant continuation value, independent of the outcome yt. Therefore, even though
the agent’s expected payoff from period t is W (φt) + δut+1(θt), ut+1(θt) = u¯, and it doesn’t
matter for the agent’s IC constraint.
We also know from the dynamic enforcement constraint that the joint surplus, both in
per period and in the expected discounted joint surplus, decrease with the outside option s¯.
Proposition 4. The per period joint surplus and the expected joint surplus weakly decrease
with the outside option s¯.
Proof. From the dynamic enforcement constraint, the bonus cap decreases with the outside
option s¯. The maximum per period joint surplus weakly decreases with s¯, which further
suppresses the bonus cap through the expected joint surplus. Therefore, both the per period
joint surplus and the expected joint surplus decrease with s¯.
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Lastly, from Proposition 3, we obtain the following characterization of optimal contracts.
When the distribution of the outcome satisfies the Mirrlees-Rogerson constraints, together
with risk-neutrality of both parties, the principal wants to use the strongest incentives pos-
sible. If an optimal contract cannot induce the first best effort eFB(θt) in state θt, the DE
constraint binds, and the compensation scheme is a step function.
Assumption 3. The distribution of the outcome F (y|e, θ) satisfies the Mirrlees-Rogerson
constraints: F (y|e, θ) has the monotone likelihood ratio property, (fe/f increases with y) and
F (y|e, θ) is convex in e for any θ.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. An optimal contract either (i) implements
eFB(θt) or (ii) takes the form of a step function at each θt. When e(θt) < e
FB(θt), there
exists y(θt) such that W (θt, y) = W¯ (θt) for y ≥ y(θt) and W (θt, y) = W (θt) for y < y(θt).
W¯ (θt) = W (θt) +
δ
1−δ (st+1(θt)− s¯), and the likelihood ratio fe/f(y|e(θt)) changes the sign at
y(θt).
Proof. We know from Proposition 1 that we can focus on maximizing the joint surplus, and
Proposition 2 implies that we can focus on stationary contracts. By the Mirrlees-Rogerson
constraints, we can replace the agent’s IC constraint with the first-order condition. The
optimal stationary contract solves
max
e(·),W (·,·)
Eθ,y[y − c|e(θ), θ]
subject to
d
de
{Ey[W (θ, y)− c(e, θ)|e = e(θ), θ]} = 0, ∀θ,
δ
1− δ (s(θ)− s¯) ≥ supθ,y W (θ, y)− infθ,y W (θ, y),
s(θ) = (1− δ)E[
∑
t=0
δt{dt(yt − c(et, θt)) + (1− dt)s¯}|θ].
From the Mirrlees-Rogerson constraints, the principal wants to maximize e when e(θt) <
eFB(θt). We get
W (θt, y) =
{
W¯ (θt) if y ≥ y(θt)
W (θt) if y < y(θt).
,
and fe changes the sign at y(θt), and W¯ (θt) = W (θt) +
δ
1−δ (st+1(θt)− s¯).
The results in this section hold for any type of persistence. When the states are observable
and exogenously given, there is no asymmetric information between the principal and the
13
agent regarding the distribution of future states. Together with risk-neutrality, the principal
can provide all incentives by the bonus payments at the end of each period and offer the
same continuation value in every state. The results in Levin (2003) extend to persistent
states, and we have shown the following results. The problem of efficient contracting can
be separated from the problem of distribution, and the joint-surplus can be maximized with
stationary contracts. The necessary and sufficient condition to implement an effort schedule
with stationary contracts is that it satisfies the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement
constraint. An optimal contract either implements the first best level of effort, or it is a step
function in each state.
4 Endogenous States
In practice, it is often natural to assume that the state variable is endogenous. Human capital
is likely to be developed by the agent’s effort over time, and the productivity is also often
endogenous. If the outcome this period determines the productivity for the next period, the
outcome itself is the state variable and is endogenous. Results in this section show that we
can apply the similar analysis to relational contracts with endogenous states, as long as the
state is observable to both the principal and the agent.
This section considers an alternative model with endogenous states. The agent’s ef-
fort and the productivity this period determine the distribution of the productivity next
period, and the outcome is a function of the productivity. Since the agent’s effort affects
the distribution of the productivity, it is an endogenous state variable. However, when the
productivity is observable to both the principal and the agent, most of the results in the
previous section generalize to this model. Specifically, I show that the problem of efficient
contracting can be separated from the distribution of joint surplus, and the maximum joint
surplus can be attained with stationary contracts. An effort schedule is implementable with
stationary contracts if and only if the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement constraint
are satisfied.
The productivity θt is drawn from Θ = [θ, θ¯]. The distribution of θt depends on θt−1 and
et−1 and is time-homogeneous. Denote the distribution by P (θt|θt−1, et−1). The distribution
of θ0 is given by P0(·). Given θt, the principal gets the outcome yt = y(θt) as a deterministic
function of the productivity. A performance outcome is φt = (θt, yt, θt+1). Note that the
outcome need not be deterministic. I assume it to be deterministic to simplify the analysis,
but the same argument works if it is stochastic and the expected outcome is a function of
the state.
The timing of the model is the following. At the beginning of period t, the principal
14
offers a contract to the agent, and the agent decides whether to accept it. The outcome is
realized as a function of the productivity, which is known from previous period. The agent
decides how much effort to exert, and the productivity for the next period is realized. The
principal and the agent make the payments.
We have the following versions of Proposition 1-3. The proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 6. Suppose there exists a relational contract with expected joint surplus s > s¯.
Any expected payoff pair (u, pi) with u ≥ u¯, pi ≥ p¯i, u + pi = s can be implemented with a
relational contract.
The proof of Proposition 6 is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 verbatim. The agent
accepts the contract as long as the expected payoff is greater than his outside option, and
the principal can always redistribute the surplus by the fixed wage.
Proposition 7. The maximum joint surplus can be attained with a stationary contract.
Furthermore, it is optimal to provide the same expected payoff to the agent in every state.
The key to the proof of Proposition 7 is that θ′ is a sufficient static about the outcome
and states from the next period. Since the principal and the agent are risk-neutral and
the productivity is observed before they make the payments, the principal can provide all
incentives by the present compensation and provide a constant expected payoff to the agent
in every state. Under an optimal contract, the expected joint surplus for given state θ is
constant, and the principal can choose the bonus payments to maximize the expected joint
surplus.
Proposition 8. An effort schedule e(θ) with expected joint surplus s(θ) can be implemented
with a stationary contract, with a constant expected payoff to the agent, if and only if there
exists a payment schedule W : Φ→ R such that for all θ ∈ Θ,
(IC) e(θ) ∈ arg max
e
Ey,θ′ [W (φ)|e, θ]− c(e, θ),
(DE)
δ
1− δ (s(θ
′)− s¯) ≥ sup
θ,y
W (θ, y, θ′)− inf
θ,y,θ′
W (θ, y, θ′).
In Proposition 8, the bonus cap now depends on the realization of the productivity for
the next period. This is because the bonus payment is contingent on the productivity for
the next period, which is the sufficient static for the expected joint surplus. The rest of the
argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.
Remark 1. When the states are observable to both the principal and the agent, even if the
states are endogenous, the optimal relational contracts are stationary. There is no informa-
tion asymmetry about the distirbution of future states, and together with risk-neutrality, we
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obtain the stationarity theorem and the necessary and sufficient condition to implement an
effort schedule.
Remark 2. The difference between the endogenous states and the exogenous states is that
instead of having a uniform bonus cap for the given state with exogenous states, the bonus
cap now depends on the realization of the productivity for the next period when they are
endogenous.
Remark 3. With exogenous states, the optimal relational contract either implements the
first best or is a step function. This no longer holds for endogenous states.
5 Joint Surplus in the Second Best
I consider the joint surplus in the second best for two types of persistence in this section.
The states are exogenous. The first case is in which the joint surplus in the first best
increases with the state. When the cost function is separable and strictly decreases with
the state, incentive provision is identical in each state, and in particular, given a bonus cap,
the principal can implement the same level of effort in every state. The second type of
persistence I consider is when the incentive provision becomes easier in a higher state. The
joint surplus in the first best is identical in all states. In both cases, the difference in joint
surplus between the first best and the second best decreases with the state. The principal
prefers relational contracts only if the initial state is sufficiently high.
5.1 Joint Surplus Varies with the State
In this section, I consider the case in which the joint surplus varies with the state and the
incentive provision is constant across the states. Specifically, I assume the following.
Assumption 4. The cost of effort is separable and strictly decreases with the state: there
exist c1 : E → R, c2 : Θ→ R such that
c(e, θ) = c1(e) + c2(θ),∀e ∈ E , θ ∈ Θ
and c′2 < 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 5. F (·|e, θ) is independent of θ.
Assumption 6. θt > θ
′
t implies P (·|θt) FOSD P (·|θ′t).
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I also define ∆W (θ) as the minimum bonus cap necessary to be able to induce the first
best level of effort in state θ. Given a state θ, eFB(θ) can be a solution to
e(θ) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[W (φ)|e]− c(e, θ),
∆W ≥ sup
y
W (θ, y)− inf
y
W (θ, y)
if and only if ∆W ≥ ∆W (θ).
As a benchmark, I first show the implications of Assumption 4 in the first best and in
the case the principle has a within-period commitment power.
Proposition 9. Suppose Assumption 4, 5 and 6 hold. The expected joint surplus in the first
best strictly increases with the state, both in per period and in the future discounted joint
surplus. The first best level of effort is constant across all states θ ∈ Θ. The minimum bonus
cap to implement the first best level of effort, ∆W (θ), is also constant across the state. If the
principal can credibly promise W (φ), the principal implements one level of effort, e∗ = eFB
in all states.
Proof. The expected joint surplus in state θ is given by
Ey[y|e]− c(e, θ) = Ey[y|e]− c1(e)− c2(θ),
and the first best level of effort is the maximand of∫
y
yf(y|e)dy − c1(e)− c2(θ).
Since the cost of effort is separable, the maximization problems for any two states are
constant transformations of each other, and the first best level of effort is constant across the
states. The cost strictly decreases with the state, and the expected per period joint surplus
in the first best in state θ strictly increases with the state. By the persistence of states,
the future discounted joint surplus also increases with the state. Since the maximization
problems are a constant transformation of each other, ∆W (θ) is constant across the states.
If the principal can commit to bonus payments, the only constraint is the agent’s IC
constraint. By the efficiency assumption, it is efficient to induce the first best level of effort
than to take the outside option in all states θ, and the principal induces the first best level
of effort in all θ.
Now consider relational contracts under Assumption 4. Define sFB(θ) as the discounted
future joint surplus when the previous state is θ. We know from Proposition 9 that ∆W (θ)
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is constant over θ. Denote ∆W (θ) = ∆W ∗. If sFB(θ) ≥ ∆W ∗, the principal can implement
the first best level of effort in all states with relational contracts, and the problem becomes
trivial. I will make the following assumption:
Assumption 7. The principal cannot induce the first best level of effort in the lowest state:
sFB(θ) < ∆W ∗.
Define e(θ|∆W ) to be the solution to the optimization problem
maxeEy[y − c|e, θ] s.t. e(θ) ∈ arg max
e
Ey[W (φ)|e]− c(e, θ),
∆W ≥ sup
y
W (θ, y)− inf
y
W (θ, y).
e(θ|∆W ) is the level of effort that maximizes the per period joint surplus in state θ when
the bonus cap is ∆W . If ∆W ≤ ∆W (θ), the principal cannot implement the first best level
of effort, and e(θ|∆W ) < eFB(θ). Since the principal can always mimic the payments with
∆W ′ if ∆W ≥ ∆W ′, the implemetable level of effort weakly increases with the bonus cap,
and we have e(θ|∆W ) ≥ e(θ|∆W ′),∀θ.
Proposition 10. The implementable level of effort e(θ|∆W ) weakly increases with ∆W for
all θ.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the principal can always mimic the compensation
scheme with ∆W ′ if ∆W ≥ ∆W ′.
Under relational contracts, the expected joint surplus from the following period limits the
principal’s ability to induce effort, and Assumption 4 states that the joint surplus in the first
best strictly increases with the state. The implementable level of effort is lower in a worse
state, and the difference in the expected joint surplus is reinforced by the implementable
effort. Under Assumption 4, the joint surplus under relational contracts increases with the
state, and the difference in the joint surplus between the first best and the second best
decreases with the state.
Proposition 11. Suppose Assumption 4, 5, 6 and 7 hold. Let sSB(θ) be the expected joint
surplus under an optimal relational contract. sSB(θ) strictly increases with θ, and ∂s
SB
∂θ
≥
∂sFB
∂θ
> 0. The difference in the joint surplus between the first best and the second best,
sFB(θ)− sSB(θ), weakly decreases with the state. The difference is strictly positive at θ, and
it is weakly bigger than zero at all θ.
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Proof. We know from Proposition 10 that the implementable level of effort, e(θ|∆W ), weakly
increases with ∆W . From Assumption 4, the expected joint surplus in the first best increases
with the state, and Assumption 7 says that the expected joint surplus in the state θ is less
than the minimum bonus cap to induce the first best level of effort. Since the distribution
of the states increases with the state in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, the
implementable level of effort under an optimal relational contract increases with the state,
and the expected joint surplus in the second best also increases with the state.
Consider the difference in per period joint surplus between the first best and the second
best.
S(eFB, θ)− S(e(θ|∆W ), θ)
=(E[y|eFB]− c(eFB, θ))− (E[y|e(θ|∆W )]− c(e(θ|∆W ), θ))
=(E[y|eFB]− c1(eFB))− (E[y|e(θ|∆W )]− c1(e(θ|∆W ))).
Given ∆W , e(θ|∆W ) is constant across the states, and we also know that
E[y|e(θ|∆W )]− c1(e(θ|∆W ))
increases with ∆W . Therefore, the difference in the per period joint surplus,
S(eFB, θ)− S(e(θ|∆W ), θ),
decreases with the state, and by the persistence of the states, the difference in the expected
joint surplus also decreases with the state. From Assumption 7, the difference is strictly
positive at θ.
When the per period joint surplus in the first best increases with the state, the persistence
of the states enter the optimization problem through the bonus cap, and the expected joint
surplus under an optimal relational contract also increases with the state. The dynamic
enforcement constraint magnifies the impact of persistent states, and the expected joint
surplus varies more in the second best than in the first best.
5.2 Incentive Provision Varies with the State
This section considers the alternative case in which the joint surplus in the first best is
constant across the state but the incentive provision varies with the state.
I assume that the first best level of effort is constant across the states. This is without
loss of generality for any interior solution eFB. I also assume that for given bonus cap, the
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maximum per period joint surplus strictly increases with the state, and the principal cannot
implement the first best level of effort in the worst state, even with the expected joint surplus
in the first best.
Assumption 8. The first best level of effort is constant in all states. The per period joint
surplus in the first best is constant across the states: S(eFB, θ) = S∗ for all θ.
Assumption 9. For given bonus cap ∆W , if the principal cannot induce the first best
level of effort, the maximum per period joint surplus strictly increases with the state. i.e.,
S(e(θ|∆W ), θ) strictly increases with θ for all e(θ|∆W ) < eFB.
Assumption 10. The principal cannot implement the first best level of effort in the lowest
state, and e(θ|sFB) < eFB.
Under the second set of assumptions, the expected joint surplus in the second best strictly
increases with the state, and the difference in the expected joint surplus between the first
best and the second best decreases with the state. We have the following proposition which
is an analogue of Proposition 11.
Proposition 12. Suppose Assumption 6, 8, 9 and 10 hold. There exists θ∗ ∈ Θ such that
sSB(θ) strictly increases with θ for θ < θ∗, and sSB(θ) = sFB for θ ≥ θ∗. The difference in
the joint surplus between the first best and the second best, sFB − sSB(θ), decreases with the
state. The difference is strictly positive at θ, and it is weakly bigger than zero at all θ.
Proof. By Assumptions 9, 10 and the persistence of the states, the per period joint surplus
in the second best weakly increases with θ, and it increases strictly for all θ such that
e(θ|sSB(θ)) < eFB. Therefore, the expected joint surplus in the second best also increases
with the state. Since the first best joint surplus is constant across the states, the difference
between the first best and the second best decreases with the state.
I have considered two types of persistent states. In both environments, the difference
in the expected joint surplus between the first best and the second best decreases with the
state. If the two factors, the level of joint surplus in the first best and the difficulty of
incentive provision, move in the same direction, the effect will be magnified. If they move in
the opposite directions, the difference in the joint surplus will be determined by which effect
dominates.
5.3 Benefits from Relational Contracts
Suppose there exists a positive benefit from relational contracts. I define full-commitment
contracts as contracts under which the principal specifies the compensation scheme as func-
tions of history and commit to both the fixed wage and the bonus payments. In my model,
20
the only constraint under full-commitment contracts is the agent’s IC constraints, and the
principal can implement the first best under full-commitment contracts.
There could be gains from relational contracts as it is often impractical to write complete
contracts. Performance measures can be hard to describe, and often, the best performance
measure is a subjective measurement. When there is positive benefit x > 0 from relational
contracts, the principal prefers the relational contracts over full-commitment contracts if and
only if the benefit is bigger than the difference in the expected joint surplus.
Proposition 13. Suppose Assumptions 4 to 7 hold. Let x > 0 be the benefit from relational
contracts. The principal prefers relational contracts if and only if the prior on the states is
sufficiently high: ∫
θ0
sSB(θ0)dP0(θ0) + x ≥
∫
θ0
sFB(θ0)dP0(θ0).
Proof. The principal can implement the first best with full-commitment contracts. Given
prior P0 on the state, the difference in the expected joint surplus between the full-commitment
contract and the optimal relational contract is given by∫
θ0
(sFB(θ0)− sSB(θ0))dP0(θ0)− x.
Proposition 14. Suppose Assumption 6, 8, 9 and 10 hold. Let x > 0 be the benefit from
relational contracts. The principal prefers relational contracts if and only if the prior on the
states is sufficiently high: ∫
θ0
sSB(θ0)dP0(θ0) + x ≥ sFB.
Proof. The principal can implement the first best with full-commitment contracts, and the
joint surplus in the first best is constant.
6 Market for Matching
This section considers a market for matching when there is a continuum of principal-agent
pairs. In any given period, the principal and the agent have an option to exit the current
relationship. If they exit, they will be randomly, anonymously and costlessly rematched with
new partners. The main result of this section is that the nature of the underlying state leads
to different implications for the market. If the state is agent-specific, the principal-agent
pairs remain in the current relationships regardless of the realization of the state or the past
history, and there will be no market for matching. If the state is relationship-specific, there
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will be a market, and the pair leaves the relationship if and only if the expected joint surplus
falls below some threshold. If the state is a macro shock, common to all principal-agent
pairs, then cooperation is impossible, and the principal cannot induce the agent to put in
any effort. Cooperation is also impossible if the states are i.i.d..
The literature on relational contracts take the outside options as exogenous. The goal of
this section is to consider the market and to endogenize the outside options. If a continuum of
principal-agent pairs in the same contractual environment have options to be matched with
new partners, the market forms endogenous outside options for the principal-agent pairs.
The implications highlight the difference between the i.i.d. states and persistent states, and
also the difference among the types of persistent states.
The timing of the game is the following. In each period, the principal offers a compensa-
tion scheme, and the agent decides whether or not ot accept it. After the agent decides, the
state is realized and becomes observable to both the principal and the agent. If the agent
accepted, he decides how much effort to put in, and the outcome is realized. The principal
and the agent make the contingent bonus payment and decide whether or not to stay in the
relationship. If they both decide to stay, they move on to the next period. If one of them
exists, both the principal and the agent will be matched with new partners and start in the
next period. If the agent rejected the offer, both receive their exogenous outside options and
decide whether to stay or exit.
With a market for matching, the outside options for the principal and the agent are
endogenously determined in an equilibrium. However, given a continuum of principal-agent
pairs, each pair takes the outside options as given, and we can apply the analysis from
Section 3. I allow for exogenous outside options as well, but this doesn’t affect the analysis,
and we can restrict attention to endogenous outside options if desired.3 In this section, s¯
refers to the endogenous outside option through matching.
The equilibria of the game depend on the strategies when the principal and the agent are
matched with new partners. For most part of this section, I focus on equilibria in which the
principal and the agent always maximize the joint surplus, when they are matched with new
partners. I will discuss at the end of the section what happens if they don’t maximize the
joint surplus. Also, the analysis in this section doesn’t rely on the stationarity or symmetry
of the strategies. The principal-agent pairs are allowed to use non-stationary contracts, and
each pair can use different contracts.
3Without loss of generality, we can assume that if the principal anticipates that the agent will reject the
offer in the next period, he chooses to exit the relationship.
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6.1 When the States are i.i.d.
This section considers the i.i.d. states as a benchmark. Cooperation is impossible if there is
frictionless market for matching and if the principal-agent pairs maximize the joint surplus
in a new relationship.
Proposition 15. Suppose the states are i.i.d., and the principal and the agent can be ran-
domly, anonymousy, and costlessly matched with new partners. If the principal-agent pairs
maximize the joint surplus in a new relationship, the principal cannot induce any level of
effort from the agent.
Proof. After the outcome is realized, the principal makes the bonus payment if and only if
δ
1− δ (pi − p¯i) ≥ supy b(θ, y),∀θ,
and the agent makes the bonus payment if and only if
δ
1− δ (u− u¯) ≥ − infy b(θ, y),∀θ.
Together, we have
δ
1− δ (s− s¯) ≥ supy b(θ, y)− infy b(θ, y).
However, if they maximize the joint surplus when matched with new partners and the
states are i.i.d., s = s¯, and the bonus payment has to be the same for all outcomes. The
agent has no incentive to put in any effort.
Note that I don’t require the strategies to be stationary or symmetric. The only require-
ment is that the princpial and the agent maximize the joint surplus when they are matched
with new partners, but when they do, they can’t have any level of cooperation. In order
to have any cooperation, they cannot maximize the joint surplus when they are matched
with new partners; this case is considered in Section 6.5. Also note that, in order to have
cooperation, they have to supress the joint surplus. Delaying the payment doesn’t help.
6.2 Relationship-Specific State
Suppose that the states are persistent and the state is specific to the pair of principal and
agent. If they exit the current relationship, the initial state in a new relationship is drawn
from a known distribution G and is i.i.d. across the new pairs of principals and agents. Then
there is endogenous threshold for the joint surplus such that the principal and the agent exit
the relationship if and only if the expected joint surplus falls below the threshold.
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Proposition 16. Suppose the initial state is i.i.d. across the new pairs of principals and
agents and is drawn from a known distribution G. The principal and the agent exit the current
relationship if and only if the expected joint surplus falls below some threshold. When the
state is such that they will exit, the agent doesn’t put in any effort.
Proof. From Section 3, the principal and the agent stay in the relationship if and only if
s(θ) ≥ s¯, where s¯ is the expected joint surplus from being matched with a new partner. If
s(θ) < s¯, the bonus payment is the same for all outcomes, and the agent doesn’t put in any
effort.
When the state is specific to the principal-agent pair, they remain in the relationship if
and only if the expected joint surplus is above the threshold. Since the states are observable
and the principal and the agent maximize the joint surplus, the state in this period completely
summarizes the expected joint surplus from the next period and on, and the exit behavior
is determined by the realization of the state.
Contrary to the i.i.d. case, there is some degree of cooperation in any equilibrium,
except for the degenerate case in which the expected joint surplus from the new distribution
G dominates the expected joint surplus after any state. Even if the principal and the agent
maximize the joint surplus in every relationship, the principal can induce the agent to exert
effort in a good enough state.
6.3 Agent-Specific State
Next, consider the case in which the state is the type of the agent. It can be interpreted as the
productivity of the agent. When the agent is matched with a new principal, the distribution
of the state is determined by his type in the last period, which is the last realizaiton of the
state in the agent’s previous relationship. In this case, I show the market for matching turns
into the market for lemons; there cannot be a market for matching, and all principal-agent
pairs stay in their relationship forever.
Proposition 17. Suppose when a principal and an agent is matched, the initial state is
drawn from the distribution P (·|θ) where θ is the last realization of the state of the agent.
The principal and the agent never exit the current relationship, and there is no market for
rematching.
Proof. From Section 3, we can focus on the joint surplus from the relationship, and the
principal and the agent remain in the current relationship if and only if s(θ) ≥ s¯. Let
Θˆ = {θ|s(θ) < s¯} ⊂ Θ be the set of states after which the principal and the agent exit the
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relationship. Let F be the distribution of the states in the given period. When the principal
and the agent decide whether to stay in the relationship, the outside option must satisfy
s¯ =
∫
s∈Θˆ
s(θ)dF,
which is a contradiction to the definition of Θˆ. Therefore, Θˆ is degenerate and can only be
∅.
If the principal and the agent maximize the joint surplus when they are matched with
new partners, the lowest type is indifferent between staying in and exiting the relationship.
When the realized state is such, the parties cannot make any bonus payment, and the agent
puts in no effort. If they don’t maximize the joint surplus, even the lowest type prefers to
stay in the current relationship. The principal and the agent never exit the relationship, and
there is no market for rematching.
Proposition 17 shows that if the underlying state is the type of the agent, the market for
matching turns into a market for lemons, and there will not be a market. Only the lowest
type can exist in the market, and all principal-agent pairs stay in the current relationship.
Note that the result doesn’t depend on the strategies of the principal-agent pairs when
matched with new partners. Proposition 17 holds even if the principal and the agent don’t
maximize the joint surplus in new relationships.
6.4 Macro Shock
This section considers a macro shock. The state is common to all principal-agent pairs.
In this case, the principal cannot induce the agent to put in any effort, and cooperation is
impossible.
Proposition 18. Suppose the state is common to all principal-agent pairs. If the principal
and the agent maximize the joint surplus in every relationship, the principal cannot induce
the agent to put in any effort.
Proof. The proof is the same as in the i.i.d. case. If the state is common to all principal-
agent pairs, s = s¯ in the dynamic enforcement constraint, and the principal pays the same
bonus for all payments. The agent has no incentive to put in any effort.
If the state is common to all principal-agent pairs, the expected joint surplus from the
next period and on is the same whether they remain in the current relationship or are
matched with new partners. Then, the principal and the agent have no incentive to pay the
bonus payment, and without the bonus payments, cooperation is impossible.
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6.5 Not Maximizing the Joint Surplus
This section discusses what happens when the principal and the agent don’t maximize the
joint surplus when they are matched with new partners. The degree of cooperation depends
on the endogenous outside option determined in a market, and the maximum cooperation the
principal and the agent can have weakly decreases with the outside option. The maximum
cooperation is possible if they revert to the static equilibrium when matched with new
partners. However, any equilibrium in which the pairs don’t maximize the joint surplus is
not renegotiation proof.
Proposition 19. The maximum joint surplus weakly decreases with the outside option s¯
determined in an equilibrium. The maximum joint surplus is the largest if the principal and
the agent revert to the static equilibrium when matched with new partners. Ex ante maximum
joint surplus also weakly decreases with the outside option.
Proof. We know from Section 3 that without a market, the joint surplus decreases with the
outside option s¯. When there is a market, if s(θ) < s¯, the principal and the agent cannot
make any bonus payment in that period, the agent puts in no effort, and the parties exit
the relationship at the end of the period. When s¯ increases, the set of states after which
the relationship ends increases. Increase in s¯ also means that the bonus cap in a given
state is lower, and the per period joint surplus the principal can induce is weakly lower.
Together, the maximum joint surplus in every state weakly decreases with s¯. Since the
endogenous outside option is the minimum when the parties revert to the static equilibrium,
the parties can attain the maximum joint surplus if they revert to the static equilibirum in
new relationships. When the maximum joint surplus in each state weakly decreases with the
outside option, ex ante maximum joint surplus also weakly decreases.
We know from Proposition 1 that the distribution of joint surplus doesn’t affect efficient
contracting. If the parties are not maximizing the joint surplus, they can always renegotiate
and redistribute the surplus. The only contracts that are renegotiation-proof are the ones
that maximize the joint surplus in every relationship, and for such contracts, I have shown
the following.
Remark 4. When there is a market for matching, the persistence of states leads to very
different outcomes from the i.i.d. states. If the principal and the agent always maximize the
joint surplus, and if there is a frictionless market for matching, cooperation is impossible with
i.i.d. states or macro shocks. On the contrary, there is always some degree of cooperation
with relationship-specific states, and there is no market if the states are specific to the agent.
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Remark 5. Ex ante joint surplus is strictly lower with the market, if the states are i.i.d. or
common to all principal-agent pairs and if the principal and the agent always maximize the
joint surplus. The market doesn’t affect the ex ante joint surplus with agent-specific states.
The effect of market on ex ante joint surplus is ambiguous for relationship-specific states.
When the states are specific to the relationship, there are two effects of a market on ex
ante joint surplus. There are some states in which the agent puts in no effort because the
principal and the agent will exit the relationship, but they can also have a new draw instead
of staying in the low states. The overall effect depends on which effect dominates.
7 Conclusion
I study relational contracts in a persistent environment in this paper. I find that many of the
general properties of the optimal relational contracts in i.i.d. states carry over to persistent
states, if there is no asymmetric information about the state. The benchmark is when the
states are observable and exogenously given. When the states follow a first-order Markov
chain, the state in any given period is a sufficient static for the distribution of future states.
In particular, the outcome doesn’t have any information about the distribution of future
states, and the principal can provide the incentives by the bonus payments in the given
period. It is optimal to provide the same expected per period payoff in every state.
If the continuation contract for a given state in some period provides the maximum joint
surplus for the given state, the principal can provide the same continuation contract in every
period for the given state. Since the agent gets the same expected payoff in all states, the
agent’s IC constraints are still satisfied when the principal replaces the continuation contract,
and the optimal contract can be stationary. The principal can also redistribute the surplus
through the fixed wage, and we get the dynamic enforcement constraint as with i.i.d. states.
An effort schedule can be implemented with stationary contracts if and only if it satisfies the
IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement constaint. As was the case with i.i.d. states, the
principal can either implement the first best effort, or the optimal contract takes the form
of a step function.
The properties of the optimal contracts hold for endogenous states if the states are
observable. The maximum joint surplus can be attained with a stationary contract when
the productivity is the state variable. When the productivity is observed before the principal
makes the payment, there is no information asymmetry about the state. The agent’s effort
affects the distribution of future states, but given the productivity for the next period, the
principal and the agent have symmetric information about the distribution of future states.
The principal can adjust the present compensation and provide the incentives by bonus
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payments, while keeping the expected payoff constant. Then, the incentive provision in each
state becomes myopic, and the principal can offer a stationary contract and maximize the
joint surplus. A version of dynamic enforcement constraint, together with the IC constraint,
is the necessary and sufficient condition to implement an effort schedule with such stationary
contracts.
Persistent states can affect the relational contracts through two mechanisms. The per-
sistence of the states implies that if the joint surplus depends on the state, the bonus cap
also varies with the state, and the implementable level of effort depends on the state, even
if the incentive provision for the given bonus cap is identical in each state. On the other
hand, the incentive provision for the given bonus cap can also change with the state. If the
joint surplus in the first best increases with the state, or if the implementable level of effort
for given bonus cap increases with the state, the difference in the joint surplus between the
first best and the second best decreases with the state. The principal prefers the relational
contracts to full-commitment contracts only if the initial state is sufficiently high.
I show that the nature of the state has starkly different implications for the market when
the principal and the agent can be randomly, anonymously, and costlessly matched with
new partners. Cooperation is impossible if the states are i.i.d. and the parties maximize
the joint surplus in every relationship. If the states are persistent, we get varying degree of
cooperation depending on the type of the state. If it’s agent-specific, the principal and the
agent stay in the relationship forever, and there is no market. If it’s relationship-specific,
they exit the current relationship if and only if the expected joint surplus falls below some
threshold. With macro shocks, cooperation is impossible, and the principal cannot induce
any level of effort.
I have considered partially persistent environments where the states are observable and
the persistence is of first-order. If the states are observable, both with exogenous and endoge-
nous states, the optimal contract can be stationary. However, if the states are unobservable,
there can be information asymmetry between the principal and the agent about the future
states. The belief about the agent’s effort matters for the future, and the relational contract
will likely have to take into account the private information. It will be interesting to study
relational contracts and their implications for the market when the information about the
future states is no longer symmetric.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the relational contract that provides s. The principal offers
in the initial period w(θ0), b(φ0), and if the agent accepts, he exerts effort e(θ0). The
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continuation payoffs under the contract are denoted by u(φ0) and pi(φ0), and the expected
payoffs from the contract are u0 and pi0. Without loss of generality, we can assume that off
the equilibrium path, the parties revert to the static equilibrium of (u¯, p¯i). The first period
payment W is a function of φ0.
The contract is self-enforcing if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) u0 ≥ u¯, pi0 ≥ p¯i,
(ii) e(θ0) ∈ arg max
e
Eθ1 [(1− δ)W (φ0) + δu(φ0)|e, θ0]− c(e, θ0),
(iii) b(φ0) +
δ
1− δu(φ0) ≥
δ
1− δ u¯,
− b(φ0) + δ
1− δpi(φ0) ≥
δ
1− δ p¯i,
and (iv) each continuation contract is self-enforcing.
Given any (u, pi) such that u ≥ u¯, pi ≥ p¯i, u + pi = s, the principal can offer the same
b(φ0) and continuation contracts and adjust w(θ0) to
wˆ(θ0) ≡ w(θ0) + pi − pi0
1− δ .
The conditions are satisfied with the new contract, and it provides (u, pi) as the expected
payoffs.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose a contract that maximizes the joint surplus provides wt, bt
and the agent chooses et. The first step is to construct an alternative contract wˆt, bˆt under
which the agent chooses the same level of effort et and his expected payoff is constant in
every state.
When the states are observable, the distribution of the states from period t + 1 only
depends on θt+1, which is observed before the principal makes payments in period t. The
principal can adjust the contingent payment bt and keep the expected payoff in each state
constant. Specifically, consider the following contract. Let ut(h
t, φt) be the continuation
value of the agent under the given contract, and define wˆt, bˆt as the following:
bˆt(h
t, φt) ≡ bt(ht, φt) + δ
1− δ (ut(h
t, φt)− u¯),
wˆt(h
t, θt) ≡ u¯− Eθt+1 [bˆt(ht, φt)|et(ht, θt)].
From
bˆt(h
t, φt) +
δ
1− δ u¯ = bt(h
t, φt) +
δ
1− δut(h
t, φt),
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the agent chooses the same level of effort et under the new contract. The agent’s expected
payoff is u¯ for all t, ht, θt.
The next step is to show that we can choose w˜ : Θ → R, b˜ : Φ → R such that the
principal offers w˜, b˜ in every period. Consider wˆt and bˆt. The agent’s expected payoff is
constant over all t, ht, and θt, which implies that the agent’s IC constraint is determined by
the within period compensation scheme. Specifically, the agent chooses e such that
et(h
t, θt) ∈ arg max
e
Eθt+1 [bˆt(ht, φt)|e, θt]− c(e, θt).
When the agent’s IC constraints are myopic, the principal can replace a compensation
scheme for any given period with another compensation scheme without affecting the incen-
tives. Under an optimal contract, st(θt) is constant for given state θt. If there’s multiplicity
of the compensation schemes, we can pick one without loss of generality.
Given b˜ : Φ→ R, the agent chooses e : Θ→ E such that
e(θt) ∈ arg max
e
Eθt+1 [b˜(φ)|e, θt]− c(e, θt).
Define w˜ as
w˜(θt) ≡ u¯− Eθt+1 [b˜(φ)|e(θt), θt],
and we have a stationary contract that maximizes the expected joint surplus. By con-
struction, it is self-enforcing, and it provides the same expected payoff to the agent in all
t, ht, θt.
Proof of Proposition 8. (⇒) Suppose e(θ) is implementable with a stationary contract that
provides uˆ ≥ u¯ to the agent in every state. Let pi(θ′) be the continuation value for the
principal when the realized productivity is θ′. The IC constraint has to be satisfied, and we
know that
δ
1− δ (pi(θ
′)− p¯i) ≥ b(θ, y, θ′),∀θ, θ′, y, (3)
δ
1− δ (uˆ− u¯) ≥ −b(θ, y, θ
′),∀θ, θ′, y (4)
have to hold. Adding the two inequalities, we have the dynamic enforcement constraint.
(⇐) Suppose W (φ) and e(θ) satisfy the IC constraint and the dynamic enforcement
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constraint. Define
b(φ) = W (φ)− inf
φ
W (φ),
w(θ) = u¯− Ey,θ′ [b(φ)|e(θ), θ],
and consider the stationary contract with w(θ), b(φ) and e(θ). The parties revert to the
static equilibrium if a deviation occurs. The agent receives u¯ as expected payoff in each
state, and the principal receives pi(θ) = s(θ) − u¯ if the productivity is θ. By the dynamic
enforcement constraint, s(θ) ≥ s¯ and pi(θ) ≥ p¯i for all θ. From the IC constraint, the agent
chooses e(θ) in each state θ, and it can be verified that Inequality (3) and (4) are satisfied.
References
[1] Athey, Susan, and Kyle Bagwell. ”Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks.” Econometrica
76 (2008): 493-540.
[2] Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. ”Relational Contracts and the
Theory of the Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002): 39-84.
[3] Battaglini, Marco. ”Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers.” American
Economic Review 95 (2005): 637-58.
[4] Bull, Clive. ”The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 102 (1987): 147-59.
[5] Eeckhout, Jan. ”Minorities and Endogenous Segregation.” Review of Economic Studies
73 (2006): 31-53.
[6] Escobar, Juan F., and Juuso Toikka. 2012. ”Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private
Information.” http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/toikka/papers.
[7] Fudenberg, Drew, Bengt Holmstrom, and Paul Milgrom. ”Short-Term Contracts and
Long-Term Agency Relationships.” Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990): 1-31.
[8] Fujiwara-Greve, Takako, and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara. ”Voluntarily Separable Re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Review of Economic Studies 76 (2009): 993-1021.
[9] Garrett, Daniel, and Alessandro Pavan. 2011. ”Dynamic Manage-
rial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes.”
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/ apa522/.
31
[10] Garrett, Daniel, and Alessandro Pavan. 2012. ”Managerial Turnover in a Changing
World.” http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/ apa522/.
[11] Ghosh, Parikshit, and Debraj Ray. ”Cooperation in Community Interaction Without
Information Flows.” Review of Economic Studies 63 (1996): 491-519.
[12] Haltiwanger, John, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. ”The Impact of Cyclical Demand
Movements on Collusive Behavior.” RAND Journal of Economics 22 (1991): 89-106.
[13] Kranton, Rachel E. ”The Formation of Cooperative Relationships.” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 12 (1996): 214-33.
[14] Kreps, David M. ”Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” In Perspectives on Positive
Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 90-143. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[15] Kwon, Suehyun. 2012. ”Dynamic Moral Hazard with Persistent States.”
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/skwon/papers.
[16] Levin, Jonathan. ”Relational Incentive Contracts.” American Economic Review 93
(2003): 835-57.
[17] MacLeod, W. Bentley, and James M. Malcomson. ”Implicit Contracts, Incentive Com-
patibility, and Involuntary Unemployment.” Econometrica 57 (1989): 447-80.
[18] McAdams, David. ”Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership.” American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (2011): 107-42.
[19] Rayo, Luis. ”Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams.” Review of Economic
Studies 74 (2007): 937-63.
[20] Rogerson, William P. ”The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems.” Econo-
metrica 53 (1985): 1357-67.
[21] Rotemberg, Julio J., and Garth Saloner. ”A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars
during Booms.” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 390-407.
[22] Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. ”Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Disci-
pline Device.” American Economic Review 74 (1984): 433-44.
[23] Tchistyi, Alexei. 2006. ”Security Design with Correlated Hidden Cash Flows: The Op-
timality of Performance Pricing.” http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Tchistyi/.
32
[24] Thomas, Jonathan, and Tim Worrall. ”Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Ex-
propriation.” Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994): 81-108.
[25] Thomas, Jonathan, and Tim Worrall. 2010. ”Dynamic Relational Contracts with Credit
Constraints.” The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1009.
[26] Watson, Joel. ”Starting Small and Renegotiation.” Journal of Economic Theory 85
(1999): 52-90.
33
